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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CLINTON ROBERTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16098 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with forgery, a felony of 
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted before a jury of 
uttering, with purpose to defraud, a bank check in the amount 
of $331.14 purporting to bear the signature of David Farmer, 
in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in 
' and for Utah County, Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
presiding. Appellant was sentenced to confinement in the 
Utah State Prison for a period of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction 
and judgment entered against the appellant in the lower 
court. In addition, respondent seeks a decision from 
this Court upholding the sentencing procedure used below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 24, 1978, appellant entered Bullock's 
Billiards, 190 West Center, Provo, Utah, with two other men, 
Ned Lynn Topham and Terry Moore (T.26,40). Appellant had 
obtained a check drawn on the account of the All-Weather 
Insulation Company from Terry Moore (T.28), who had 
previously been an employee of All-Weather (T.23). Upon 
entering Bullock's Billiards, appellant told Mr. Mortenson, 
an employee of Bullock's, that he was Glen Reynolds (T.ll). 
Appellant endorsed a check for $331.14 payable to Glen 
Reynolds and Mortenson gave him $100.00 (T.ll). The 
remaining $231.14 was received by Terry Moore on Harch 27, 
1978 (T.l2), for the appellant. 
At trial, the appellant chose to take the witness 
stand. On cross-examination, he was asked whether he had 
previously been convicted of a felony (T.48). The appellant 
answered in the affirmative, stating that the offense was 
for insufficient fund checks (T.48). No objection to this 
-2-
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line of questioning was made. Appellant now contends that 
the questioning (expressly authorized by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-24-9 (1953)ldenied him equal protection of the law. 
The jury found the appellant guilty of violating 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953) (T. 75), and counsel for 
appellant requested that a presentence report be compiled 
(T.77). This request was granted and imposition of sentence 
was set for September 8, 1978 (T.78). This date was later 
changed to September 15, 1978 (R.l5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-9 (1953), AS AMENDED, 
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH Al'1ENDMENT. 
Appellant asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 
(1953), as amended, which allows the prosecution on cross-
examination to ask a witness if he has previously been 
convicted of a felony, creates an invidious discrimination 
against him, depriving him of equal protection of the laws 
because the admission of this evidence "minimizes his 
opportunity for a fair trial upon the relevant issues as 
compared to a defendant not yet having been convicted of a 
previous felony." (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) Appellant 
also alleges that Section 78-24-9 is not supported by any 
rational basis for differentiation. 
-3-
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The appellant bases his argument on Amendment 
XIV of the United States Constitution: 
No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of the citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law. 
Th8 concept embodied in Section 78-24-9, which 
the appellant attacks, is a time-honored rule dating back 
to 1898. The English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 removed 
the accused's incompetence to testify and enabled an accused's 
record of prior convictions to get before a jury under certain 
conditions. 1 
The United States first adopted the rule in 1911 
when a Pennsylvania Statute closely followed the provisions 
of the English Act. 2 Since that time, the general rule with 
regard to prior convictions has been that such evidence is 
admissible to show intent, motive, plan, etc., character of 
the witness, and credibility of the witness. 
Appellant's contentions are without merit for 
several reasons. First, the appellant is barred from raising 
1 Wigmore, I Wigmore on Evidence § 194a, pp. 652-659. 
2 Ibid., p. 657. 
-4-
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an equal protection argument since he failed to assert 
such argument in the lower court. Appellant's counsel 
failed to object and is now raising the issue for the 
first time. 
In the instant case, witness Roberts was asked 
whether he had previously been convicted, the date of 
the conviction, and the nature of the conviction (T.48). 
The failure of the defense attorney to object could have 
been trial strategy; perhaps he did not want to stress the 
fact and felt it was unnecessary to object. In any event, 
if he failed to voice objection he cannot raise the issue 
for review on appeal. Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 
(1953), as amended, provides that "a witness must answer 
as to the fact of his previous conviction of felony," and 
thus the prosecution had the right, sanctioned by statute, 
to adduce evidence of appellant's prior felony convictions 
once appellant took the stand; therefore, appellant's 
contention is without merit. The evidence of prior 
conviction could have been ad~itted to show intent, 
knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. In addition, the evidence of 
prior conviction could have been introduced to impeach 
appellant's credibility once he had taken the stand. 
-5-
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Appellant, however, contends that this situation 
constitutes an exception to the rule of practice which 
provides that an issue cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. In Krause v. Sacramento, 479 F.2d 988 
(1973), relied on by appellant, the Ninth Circuit agreed 
to hear an equal protection argument not raised in the 
Federal District Court and said: 
Relaxation of this rule is sometimes 
appropriate in appeals wherein there are 
significant questions of general impact or 
when injustice might otherwise result. 
Id. at 989. 
The commPnts adduced by the prosecutor in the 
instant case were elicited during fundamental foundation 
questions to the State's witness; they were not emphasized 
nor highlighted by further testimony and, therefore, are 
not prejudicial to appellant. The rationale of Krause, 
therefore, is inapplicable. 
In making a determination of the constitutionality 
of statutes, the duty rests upon the courts to determine 
the scope of the powers of all three branches of government 
and they must exercise a high degree of restraint to keep 
themselves from infringing upon the prerogatives of the 
executive or the legislative branches. It is, therefore, 
a well established rule that legislative enactments carry 
-6-
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a "strong presumption of validity" and "should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable 
basis upon which they can be found to come within the 
constitutional framework." Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 
805, 807 (Utah 1974). 
The Court in Greaves upheld the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-61-12 (1953), as amended, as legis-
lation reasonably related to a valid state interest and 
stated further that a statute \vould not be stricken down 
as being unconstitutional unless it appeared to he 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent 
submits that the appellant has not shown that Section 
78-24-9 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As noted above, the respondent contends that 
there is no "classification" on which to base an equal 
protection argument. Assuming, arguendo, that the 
statute in question does set up a scheme of classification, 
an appropriate standard of review must be chosen. In 
assessing the constitutionality of a statute on a denial 
of equal protection theory, two tests have traditionally 
been applied. 
-7-
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One test requires that a compelling state interest 
be the purpose behind the statute. This test is applied 
when one of the following suspect classifications is 
involved: race, alienage, wealth, indigency and 
illegitimacy. 
In ordinary cases, like the instant one, the 
reviewing court will apply the rule that differential 
treatment is valid providing there is a reasonable basis 
for the classification. Courts have recognized a presumption 
which operates in favor of the reasonableness of legislative 
classifications. If any state of facts can reasonably be 
conceived that would justify the classification, the existence 
of those facts will be assumed by the court to be the basis 
for the classification in order to uphold the legislation. 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 
337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 
(Utah 1974). 
B. APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953), as amended, serves 
a legitimate purpose. This purpose was outlined in State v. 
Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 407 (1963), when this court 
stated: 
-8-
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The apparent purpose and reason for 
permitting the prosecution to question the 
accused regarding prior felony convictions 
is to affect his credibility as a witness. 
However, the details or circumstances 
surrounding the felony or felonies for 
which the accused was convicted may not be 
inquired into except under unusual circum-
stances, when the inquiry would tend to 
show a scheme, plan, modus operandi, or 
the like. In the instant case the details 
of the prior felony conviction were not 
asked of the defendant. 
Id. at 409. 
In Kazda, the defendant appealed from a conviction 
of assault with intent to commit murder and robbery and 
assigned as error the fact that on cross-examination, it 
was elicited that he had several prior felony convictions, 
unrelated to the instant charge, and that the admission of 
the evidence amounted to a general assault upon his character 
constituting prejudicial error. This Court found the 
appellant's argument to be without merit stating that when a 
defendant voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be 
asked whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony 
and this question is sanctioned by the statute. Kazda at 
409. The rational basis of the statute, therefore, is to 
test the credibility'of the defendant as a witness the same 
as would be done for any other witness. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-44-5 (1953), states: "If a defendant offers himself as 
a witness, he ~ay be cross-examined by the counsel for the 
-9-
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state the same as any other witness ••• Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953), as amended, states: 
A witness must answer questions legal 
and pertinent to the matter in issue, ••• 
[including] a witness must answer as to the 
fact of his previous conviction of felony. 
State v. Harless, 23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210 (1969). 
This Court in Harless described the state 
interest involved here: 
That this type of interrogation (asking 
a defendant if he had been convicted of a 
felony) is generally allowed derives from 
the idea that there is a basis in reason 
and experience why one may place more 
credence in the testimony of one who has 
lived within the rules of society and the 
discipline of the law than in that of one 
who has demonstrated antisocial tendency 
as to be involved in and convicted of 
serious crime. 
The Court went on to say: 
••• it seems hardly fair to suppress 
such facts and let him (the defendant) testify 
with the same credit as one who has led a more 
blameless life. The exposure of the felony 
record of an accused of course does not mean 
that his testimony is necessarily to be 
entirely disbelieved or discredited, but 
inasmuch as it is the resnonsibility or--the 
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
it is deemed to be something which they are 
enTitled to know so they can take it into 
consideration with all the other facts and 
Clrcumstances in determining what they will 
believe. 
Id. at 211 (emphasis added). 
-10-
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More recent Utah cases have similarly upheld 
the use of Section 78-24-9. State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d 
1029 (1973), State v. Duran, 522 P.2d 1374 (1974), and 
State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335 (1977). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953), as amended, 
therefore, is constitutional. It has a rational basis 
in that it serves as a means of testing the credibility of 
a witness. In addition, it serves a legitimate state 
interest in supplying the court and the jury with informa-
tion which is helpful to them in determining what they 
will and will not believe. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION TO FURNISH A DEFENDANT WITH A 
COPY OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT RESTS 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT; APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND 
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES '1-IERE NOT DENIED 
SINCE THIS DISCRETION 'l-IAS NOT ABUSED. 
Appellant contends that the unavailability of a 
copy of the presentence report and the fact that the court, 
in making its decision not to place him on probation relied 
on information in that report, effectively denied the 
appellant of his rights to counsel and to confrontation 
of the witnesses. Appellant claims that his right to 
confrontation of the witnesses was denied because Utah 
-11-
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Code Ann. § 77-35-13 (1953), as amended, states that circum-
stances in aggravation and mitigation of the punishment to 
be imposed must be presented by the testimony of witnesses 
in open court. This contention is without merit. 
This Court has consistently held that the decision 
to furnish a defendant with a copy of the presentence 
report rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
In the case of State v. Doremus, 29 Utah 2d 373, 510 P.2d 
529 (1971), the defendant sought reversal of her sentence 
on the sole ground that the court failed to allow the 
defense to inspect the presentence report. This Court held: 
In order that there be no doubt as to 
what we believe to be the proper rule, it 
is the opinion of this court that it be 
left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether or not the 
contents of the presentence investigation 
report should be furnished to the defendant. 
Id. at 529. 
This statement of the law was reaffirmed in 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (1978), where the appellant 
claimed that the court co~~itted reversible error by not 
disclosing the contents of the presentence report to the 
defendant and his counsel. Once again, this Court stated 
that whether the presentence report should be furnished to 
the defendant is something vrhich rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
-12-
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In another recent case, Reddish v. Smith, 576 P.2d 
859 (1978), the defendant requested a presentence report. 
The Court received the report but did not make it available 
to the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the 
report contained false information and that he was denied an 
opportunity to rebut such information. There was no claim 
that the appellant was being held under an improper sentence. 
This Court held that while "the discretion of the court would 
permit it to indicate to defendant's counsel the nature'of 
the statements made and then permit the defendant to offer 
evidence on the matter," there was no obligation to permit 
inspection of the presentence report. 
It should be noted that there were two dissents in 
the Reddish case, due largely to the fact that the defendant 
claimed that the presentence report was inaccurate and that 
he should have had the opportunity to determine if the court 
had relied on the alleged inaccuracies in assessing the sentence. 
In the present case, however, no claim of inaccuracy has been 
made. In addition, the lower court specifically stated that 
it was relying on the defendant's past record in denying 
probation. The appellant's counsel was asked to verify that 
information: 
-13-
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THE COURT: . But probation 
isn't indicated in Mr. Robert's case. 
His ~e~rd is too long. He has been 
in trouble too much. 
THE COURT: He has had probation 
revoked twice and he has had parole 
revoked twice. That's right, isn't 
it? 
Appellant's brief, p. 23. 
The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion 
by relying on the information contained in the presentence 
report to assess the sentence and to deny inspection of the 
report. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of equal protection is indicative of 
the court's unfledging resolve to ensure equality of 
treatment before the law. Respondent, however, submits that 
the equal protection doctrine was never intended to protect 
defendants from treatment accorded to all witnesses. 
Appellant has, as do all defendants, the right to refrain 
from taking the witness stand. Once he makes the decision 
to testify, he becomes a witness, subject to examination to 
test his credibility as any witness. Moreover, appellant 
failed to raise his equal protection claim to the court 
below and failed to object to the questioning he now complains 
of. Thus, he has waived the right to raise the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
-14-
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying appellant's request to see the presentence report. 
The appellant was aware of those facts relied on by the 
court in denying probation and failed to provide evidence 
that the information was inaccurate. 
On the basis of the above authority and the 
evidence at trial, respondent asserts that the judgment 
of the lower court was proper and prays that the verdict 
and sentence be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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